The youngest architecture addition to the mainline Linux kernel was C-Sky (arch/csky/).

I have a GX6605S board booting a downstream 4.9 kernel. It uses a proprietary GxLoader bootloader (similarities with U-Boot exist but no sources...) with uImage and gx6605s.dtb files in a FAT partition on USB stick.

I prepared a csky-elf GCC cross-toolchain and would like to try building and booting a mainline kernel on that board. This will involve writing a mainline-compatible .dts for this board that, if successful, I could contribute upstream.

Besides learning about this architecture and any commonalities and differences, I am curious whether I can use the 3 accessible GPIOs on the board for connecting any radio transceivers for testing my LoRa, FSK, etc. kernel network drivers. Too little for bit-banging SPI, I guess, and seemingly no pin-muxing to UART. Maybe some I²C sensor though?

Looking for hackers with the skills:

csky kernel

This project is part of:

Hack Week 18

Activity

  • over 5 years ago: lyan liked this project.
  • over 5 years ago: a_faerber added keyword "csky" to this project.
  • over 5 years ago: a_faerber added keyword "kernel" to this project.
  • over 5 years ago: a_faerber started this project.
  • over 5 years ago: a_faerber originated this project.

  • Comments

    • a_faerber
      over 5 years ago by a_faerber | Reply

      It was confirmed today that upstream GCC is still lacking support for ck610. So my sub-project of packaging a csky-elf abiv1 cross-compiler is dead for now.

    • a_faerber
      over 5 years ago by a_faerber | Reply

      Yesterday compiled and booted mainline and linux-next kernels (up to an error executing the init process), sending out a patch for the Device Tree I derived.

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