Officially Become a Kernel Hacker! by m.crivellari

Description

My studies as well my spare time are dedicated to the Linux Kernel. Currently I'm focusing on interrupts on x86_64, but my interests are not restricted to one specific topic, for now.

I also "played" a little bit with kernel modules (ie lantern, a toy packet analyzer) and I've added a new syscall in order read from a task A, the memory of a task B.

Maybe this will be a good chance to...

Goals

• create my first kernel patch

Resources

• https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html
• https://git-send-email.io/ (mentioned also in the kernel doc)
• https://javiercarrascocruz.github.io/kernel-contributor-1

Achivements

• found while working on a bug, this is the 1st patch: cifs: avoid deadlocks while updating iface [✅ has been merged]

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Model checking the BPF verifier by shunghsiyu

Project Description

BPF verifier plays a crucial role in securing the system (though less so now that unprivileged BPF is disabled by default in both upstream and SLES), and bugs in the verifier has lead to privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the past (e.g. CVE-2021-3490).

One way to check whether the verifer has bugs to use model checking (a formal verification technique), in other words, build a abstract model of how the verifier operates, and then see if certain condition can occur (e.g. incorrect calculation during value tracking of registers) by giving both the model and condition to a solver.

For the solver I will be using the Z3 SMT solver to do the checking since it provide a Python binding that's relatively easy to use.

Goal for this Hackweek

Learn how to use the Z3 Python binding (i.e. Z3Py) to build a model of (part of) the BPF verifier, probably the part that's related to value tracking using tristate numbers (aka tnum), and then check that the algorithm work as intended.

Resources

• Formal Methods for the Informal Engineer: Tutorial #1 - The Z3 Theorem Prover and its accompanying notebook is a great introduction into Z3
  • Has a section specifically on model checking
• Software Verification and Analysis Using Z3 a great example of using Z3 for model checking
• Sound, Precise, and Fast Abstract Interpretation with Tristate Numbers - existing work that use formal verification to prove that the multiplication helper used for value tracking work as intended
• [PATCH v5 net-next 00/12] bpf: rewrite value tracking in verifier - initial patch set that adds tristate number to the verifier

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Contributing to Linux Kernel security by pperego

Description

A couple of weeks ago, I found this blog post by Gustavo Silva, a Linux Kernel contributor.

I always strived to start again into hacking the Linux Kernel, so I asked Coverity scan dashboard access and I want to contribute to Linux Kernel by fixing some minor issues.

I want also to create a Linux Kernel fuzzing lab using qemu and syzkaller

Goals

1. Fix at least 2 security bugs
2. Create the fuzzing lab and having it running

The story so far

• Day 1: setting up a virtual machine for kernel development using Tumbleweed. Reading a lot of documentation, taking confidence with Coverity dashboard and with procedures to submit a kernel patch
• Day 2: I read really a lot of documentation and I triaged some findings on Coverity SAST dashboard. I have to confirm that SAST tool are great false positives generator, even for low hanging fruits.
• Day 3: Working on trivial changes after I read this blog post: https://www.toblux.com/posts/2024/02/linux-kernel-patches.html. I have to take confidence with the patch preparation and submit process yet.
  • First trivial patch sent: using strtruefalse() macro instead of hard-coded strings in a staging driver for a lcd display
  • Fix for a dereference before null check issue discovered by Coverity (CID 1601566) https://scan7.scan.coverity.com/#/project-view/52110/11354?selectedIssue=1601566
• Day 4: Triaging more issues found by Coverity.
  • The patch for CID 1601566 was refused. The check against the NULL pointer was pointless so I prepared a version 2 of the patch removing the check.
  • Fixed another dereference before NULL check in iwlmvmparsewowlaninfo_notif() routine (CID 1601547). This one was already submitted by another kernel hacker :(
• Day 5: Wrapping up. I had to do some minor rework on patch for CID 1601566. I found a stalker bothering me in private emails and people I interacted with me, advised he is a well known bothering person. Markus Elfring for the record.

• Wrapping up: being back doing kernel hacking is amazing and I don't want to stop it. My battery pack is completely drained but changing the scope gave me a great twist and I really want to feel this energy not doing a single task for months.

  I failed in setting up a fuzzing lab but I was too optimistic for the patch submission process.

The patches

1

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Create DRM drivers for VESA and EFI framebuffers by tdz

Description

We already have simpledrm for firmware framebuffers. But the driver is originally for ARM boards, not PCs. It is already overloaded with code to support both use cases. At the same time it is missing possible features for VESA and EFI, such as palette modes or EDID support. We should have DRM drivers for VESA and EFI interfaces. The infrastructure exists already and initial drivers can be forked from simpledrm.

Goals

• Initially, a bare driver for VESA or EFI should be created. It can take functionality from simpledrm.
• Then we can begin to add additional features. The boot loader can provide EDID data. With VGA hardware, VESA can support paletted modes or color management. Example code exists in vesafb.

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Improve various phones kernel mainline support (Qualcomm, Exynos, MediaTek) by pvorel

Similar to previous hackweeks ( https://hackweek.opensuse.org/projects/improve-qualcomm-soc-msm8994-slash-msm8992-kernel-mainline-support, https://hackweek.opensuse.org/projects/test-mainline-kernel-on-an-older-qualcomm-soc-msm89xx-explore-mainline-kernel-qualcomm-mainlining) try to improve kernel mainline support of various phones.

Result

In the end I concentrated again to msm8994:

• 507aae9a3549c ("arm64: dts: qcom: msm8994-angler: Enable power key, volume up/down") (will be in kernel 6.14)
• Testing of c910544d22347 ("arm64: dts: qcom: msm8994: Describe USB interrupts") (will be in kernel 6.14)
• WIP USB support for msm8994

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Investigate non-booting Forlinx OKMX8MX-C board (aarch64) by a_faerber

Description

In the context of a SUSE customer inquiry last year, a Forlinx OKMX8MX-C arm64 board had been relayed to me from China that a customer was not successful booting SUSE Linux Micro on. Typically this happens when the vendor's bootloader (e.g., U-Boot) is not configured properly (e.g., U-Boot's distro boot) to be compliant with Arm SystemReady Devicetree (formerly IR) band. Unfortunately I could not immediately get it to emit any output, to even diagnose why it wasn't working. There was no public documentation on the vendor's website to even confirm I was checking the right UARTs.

Earlier this year (2024) I happened to meet the ODM/OEM, Forlinx, at Embedded World 2024 in Nuremberg and again the Monday before Hackweek 24 at Electronica 2024 in Munich. The big puzzle was that the PCB print "OKMX8MX-C" does not match any current Forlinx product, there being OKMX8MM-C and OKMX8MP-C products with the Mini and Plus variants of NXP i.MX 8M family instead. One suggestion from Forlinx staff was to double-check the DIP switches on the board for boot mode selection.

Goals

Double-check the board name and investigate further what may be wrong with this board.

Resources

none

Progress

• The board name is indeed as spelled above, not matching any product on forlinx.net.
• The DIP switches were set to boot from microSD.
• Changing the DIP switches to eMMC boot did result in UART1 RS-232 output! (although at times garbled with the cable supplied and USB adapter used)
• As feared, it did not automatically load our GRUB from USB.
• Booting our GRUB manually from USB (via eMMC U-Boot commands fatload+bootefi) was unsuccessful, with partially Chinese error messages.
• This confirmed the initial suspicion, already shared with Forlinx at Embedded World 2024, that the Forlinx System-on-Module's boot firmware was not Arm SystemReady Devicetree compliant and that a firmware update would be necessary to remedy that.
• The microSD card turned out not to contain a bootable image but to only include Chinese-language board documentation (dated 20220507) and BSP files. They used a diverging name of OKMX8MQ-C.

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Create openSUSE images for Arm/RISC-V boards by avicenzi

Project Description

Create openSUSE images (or test generic EFI images) for Arm and/or RISC-V boards that are not yet supported.

Goal for this Hackweek

Create bootable images of Tumbleweed for SBCs that currently have no images available or are untested.

Consider generic EFI images where possible, as some boards can hold a bootloader.

Document in the openSUSE Wiki how to flash and use the image for a given board.

Boards that I have around and there are no images:

• Rock 3B
• Nano PC T3 Plus
• Lichee RV D1
• StartFive VisionFive (has some image needs testing)

Hack Week 22

• NanoPC T4

Hack Week 21

• NanoPi M4B
• Radxa Zero

Resources

• https://en.opensuse.org/Portal:Arm
• https://en.opensuse.org/Portal:RISC-V

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