Kanidm: A safe and modern IDM system by firstyear

Kanidm is an IDM system written in Rust for modern systems authentication. The github repo has a detailed "getting started" on the readme.

Kanidm Github

In addition Kanidm has spawn a number of adjacent projects in the Rust ecosystem such as LDAP, Kerberos, Webauthn, and cryptography libraries.

In this hack week, we'll be working on Quokca, a certificate authority that supports PKCS11/TPM storage of keys, issuance of PIV certificates, and ACME without the feature gatekeeping implemented by other CA's like smallstep.

For anyone who wants to participate in Kanidm, we have documentation and developer guides which can help.

I'm happy to help and share more, so please get in touch!

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Kanidm: A safe and modern IDM system by firstyear

Kanidm is an IDM system written in Rust for modern systems authentication. The github repo has a detailed "getting started" on the readme.

Kanidm Github

In addition Kanidm has spawn a number of adjacent projects in the Rust ecosystem such as LDAP, Kerberos, Webauthn, and cryptography libraries.

In this hack week, we'll be working on Quokca, a certificate authority that supports PKCS11/TPM storage of keys, issuance of PIV certificates, and ACME without the feature gatekeeping implemented by other CA's like smallstep.

For anyone who wants to participate in Kanidm, we have documentation and developer guides which can help.

I'm happy to help and share more, so please get in touch!

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Contributing to Linux Kernel security by pperego

Description

A couple of weeks ago, I found this blog post by Gustavo Silva, a Linux Kernel contributor.

I always strived to start again into hacking the Linux Kernel, so I asked Coverity scan dashboard access and I want to contribute to Linux Kernel by fixing some minor issues.

I want also to create a Linux Kernel fuzzing lab using qemu and syzkaller

Goals

1. Fix at least 2 security bugs
2. Create the fuzzing lab and having it running

The story so far

• Day 1: setting up a virtual machine for kernel development using Tumbleweed. Reading a lot of documentation, taking confidence with Coverity dashboard and with procedures to submit a kernel patch
• Day 2: I read really a lot of documentation and I triaged some findings on Coverity SAST dashboard. I have to confirm that SAST tool are great false positives generator, even for low hanging fruits.
• Day 3: Working on trivial changes after I read this blog post: https://www.toblux.com/posts/2024/02/linux-kernel-patches.html. I have to take confidence with the patch preparation and submit process yet.
  • First trivial patch sent: using strtruefalse() macro instead of hard-coded strings in a staging driver for a lcd display
  • Fix for a dereference before null check issue discovered by Coverity (CID 1601566) https://scan7.scan.coverity.com/#/project-view/52110/11354?selectedIssue=1601566
• Day 4: Triaging more issues found by Coverity.
  • The patch for CID 1601566 was refused. The check against the NULL pointer was pointless so I prepared a version 2 of the patch removing the check.
  • Fixed another dereference before NULL check in iwlmvmparsewowlaninfo_notif() routine (CID 1601547). This one was already submitted by another kernel hacker :(
• Day 5: Wrapping up. I had to do some minor rework on patch for CID 1601566. I found a stalker bothering me in private emails and people I interacted with me, advised he is a well known bothering person. Markus Elfring for the record.

• Wrapping up: being back doing kernel hacking is amazing and I don't want to stop it. My battery pack is completely drained but changing the scope gave me a great twist and I really want to feel this energy not doing a single task for months.

  I failed in setting up a fuzzing lab but I was too optimistic for the patch submission process.

The patches

1

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Migrate from Docker to Podman by tjyrinki_suse

Description

I'd like to continue my former work on containerization of several domains on a single server by changing from Docker containers to Podman containers. That will need an OS upgrade as well as Podman is not available in that old server version.

Goals

• Update OS.
• Migrate from Docker to Podman.
• Keep everything functional, including the existing "meanwhile done" additional Docker container that is actually being used already.
• Keep everything at least as secure as currently. One of the reasons of having the containers is to isolate risks related to services open to public Internet.
• Try to enable the Podman use in production.
• At minimum, learn about all of these topics.
• Optionally, improve Ansible side of things as well...

Resources

A search engine is one's friend. Migrating from Docker to Podman, and from docker-compose to podman-compose.

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Bot to identify reserved data leak in local files or when publishing on remote repository by mdati

Description

Scope here is to prevent reserved data or generally "unwanted", to be pushed and saved on a public repository, i.e. on Github, causing disclosure or leaking of reserved informations.

The above definition of reserved or "unwanted" may vary, depending on the context: sometime secret keys or password are stored in data or configuration files or hardcoded in source code and depending on the scope of the archive or the level of security, it can be either wanted, permitted or not at all.

As main target here, secrets will be registration keys or passwords, to be detected and managed locally or in a C.I. pipeline.

Goals

• Detection:

  • Local detection: detect secret words present in local files;
  • Remote detection: detect secrets in files, in pipelines, going to be transferred on a remote repository, i.e. via git push;

• Reporting:

  • report the result of detection on stderr and/or log files, noticed excluding the secret values.

• Acton:

  • Manage the detection, by either deleting or masking the impacted code or deleting/moving the file itself or simply notify it.

Resources

• Project repository, published on Github (link): m-dati/hkwk24;
• Reference folder: hkwk24/chksecret;
• First pull request (link): PR#1;
• Second PR, for improvements: PR#2;
• README.md and TESTS.md documentation files available in the repo root;
• Test subproject repository, for testing CI on push [TBD].

Notes

We use here some examples of secret words, that still can be improved.
The various patterns to match desired reserved words are written in a separated module, to be on demand updated or customized.

[Legend: TBD = to be done]

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CVE portal for SUSE Rancher products by gmacedo

Description

Currently it's a bit difficult for users to quickly see the list of CVEs affecting images in Rancher, RKE2, Harvester and Longhorn releases. Users need to individually look for each CVE in the SUSE CVE database page - https://www.suse.com/security/cve/ . This is not optimal, because those CVE pages are a bit hard to read and contain data for all SLE and BCI products too, making it difficult to easily see only the CVEs affecting the latest release of Rancher, for example. We understand that certain costumers are only looking for CVE data for Rancher and not SLE or BCI.

Goals

The objective is to create a simple to read and navigate page that contains only CVE data related to Rancher, RKE2, Harvester and Longhorn, where it's easy to search by a CVE ID, an image name or a release version. The page should also provide the raw data as an exportable CSV file.

It must be an MVP with the minimal amount of effort/time invested, but still providing great value to our users and saving the wasted time that the Rancher Security team needs to spend by manually sharing such data. It might not be long lived, as it can be replaced in 2-3 years with a better SUSE wide solution.

Resources

• The page must be simple and easy to read.
• The UI/UX must be as straightforward as possible with minimal visual noise.
• The content must be created automatically from the raw data that we already have internally.
• It must be updated automatically on a daily basis and on ad-hoc runs (when needed).
• The CVE status must be aligned with VEX.
• The raw data must be exportable as CSV file.
• Ideally it will be written in Go or pure Shell script with basic HTML and no external dependencies in CSS or JS.

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Setup Kanidm as OIDC provider on Kubernetes by jkuzilek

Description

I am planning to upgrade my homelab Kubernetes cluster to the next level and need an OIDC provider for my services, including K8s itself.

Goals

• Successfully configure and deploy Kanidm on homelab cluster
• Integrate with K8s auth
• Integrate with other services (Envoy Gateway, Container Registry, future deployment of Forgejo?)

Resources

• https://kanidm.github.io/kanidm/stable/

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Setup Kanidm as OIDC provider on Kubernetes by jkuzilek

Description

I am planning to upgrade my homelab Kubernetes cluster to the next level and need an OIDC provider for my services, including K8s itself.

Goals

• Successfully configure and deploy Kanidm on homelab cluster
• Integrate with K8s auth
• Integrate with other services (Envoy Gateway, Container Registry, future deployment of Forgejo?)

Resources

• https://kanidm.github.io/kanidm/stable/

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Kanidm: A safe and modern IDM system by firstyear

Kanidm is an IDM system written in Rust for modern systems authentication. The github repo has a detailed "getting started" on the readme.

Kanidm Github

In addition Kanidm has spawn a number of adjacent projects in the Rust ecosystem such as LDAP, Kerberos, Webauthn, and cryptography libraries.

In this hack week, we'll be working on Quokca, a certificate authority that supports PKCS11/TPM storage of keys, issuance of PIV certificates, and ACME without the feature gatekeeping implemented by other CA's like smallstep.

For anyone who wants to participate in Kanidm, we have documentation and developer guides which can help.

I'm happy to help and share more, so please get in touch!

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