a project by hcarvalho
Creator:
Enzo Matsumiya ematsumiya@suse.de @ SUSE Samba team
Members:
Henrique Carvalho henrique.carvalho@suse.com @ SUSE Samba team
Description
Split cifs.ko in 2 separate modules; one for SMB 1.0 and 2.0.x, and another for SMB 2.1, 3.0, and 3.1.1.
Goals
Primary
Start phasing out/deprecation of older SMB versions
Secondary
- Clean up of the code (with focus on the newer versions)
- Update cifs-utils
- Update documentation
- Improve backport workflow (see below)
Technical details
Ideas for the implementation.
- fs/smb/client/{old,new}.c to generate the respective modules
- Maybe don't create separate folders? (re-evaluate as things progresses!)
- Remove server->{ops,vals} if possible
- Clean up fs_context.* -- merge duplicate options into one, handle them in userspace utils
- Reduce code in smb2pdu.c -- tons of functions with very similar init/setup -> send/recv -> handle/free flow
- Restructure multichannel
- Treat initial connection as "channel 0" regardless of multichannel enabled/negotiated status, proceed with extra channels accordingly
- Extra channel just point to "channel 0" as the primary server, no need to allocate an extra TCPServerInfo for each one
- Authentication mechanisms
- Modernize algorithms (references: himmelblau, IAKERB/Local KDC, SCRAM, oauth2 (Azure), etc.
This project is part of:
Hack Week 24
Activity
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