Project Description
Currently kernel module signature be attached in the end of kernel module (ko file). Scott Bahling has raised that there have some benefits that kernel allows to load module with a separate signature file.
Current module signature is PKCS#7 format, I thought that it's not hard to do that. But we will need a new system call for this.
Goal for this Hackweek
Implement a proof of concept in hackweek 20.
Resources
Base on the latest kernel mainline.
No Hackers yet
Looking for hackers with the skills:
This project is part of:
Hack Week 20
Comments
Similar Projects
early stage kdump support by mbrugger
Project Description
When we experience a early boot crash, we are not able to analyze the kernel dump, as user-space wasn't able to load the crash system. The idea is to make the crash system compiled into the host kernel (think of initramfs) so that we can create a kernel dump really early in the boot process.
Goal for the Hackweeks
- Investigate if this is possible and the implications it would have (done in HW21)
- Hack up a PoC (done in HW22 and HW23)
- Prepare RFC series (giving it's only one week, we are entering wishful thinking territory here).
update HW23
- I was able to include the crash kernel into the kernel Image.
- I'll need to find a way to load that from
init/main.c:start_kernel()
probably afterkcsan_init()
- I workaround for a smoke test was to hack
kexec_file_load()
systemcall which has two problems:- My initramfs in the porduction kernel does not have a new enough kexec version, that's not a blocker but where the week ended
- As the crash kernel is part of init.data it will be already stale once I can call
kexec_file_load()
from user-space.
The solution is probably to rewrite the POC so that the invocation can be done from init.text (that's my theory) but I'm not sure if I can reuse the kexec infrastructure in the kernel from there, which I rely on heavily.
update HW24
- Day1
- rebased on v6.12 with no problems others then me breaking the config
- setting up a new compilation and qemu/virtme env
- getting desperate as nothing works that used to work
- Day 2
- getting to call the invocation of loading the early kernel from
__init
afterkcsan_init()
- getting to call the invocation of loading the early kernel from
Day 3
- fix problem of memdup not being able to alloc so much memory... use 64K page sizes for now
- code refactoring
- I'm now able to load the crash kernel
- When using virtme I can boot into the crash kernel, also it doesn't boot completely (major milestone!), crash in
elfcorehdr_read_notes()
Day 4
- crash systems crashes (no pun intended) in
copy_old_mempage()
link; will need to understand elfcorehdr... - call path
vmcore_init() -> parse_crash_elf_headers() -> elfcorehdr_read() -> read_from_oldmem() -> copy_oldmem_page() -> copy_to_iter()
- crash systems crashes (no pun intended) in
Day 5
- hacking
arch/arm64/kernel/crash_dump.c:copy_old_mempage()
to see if crash system really starts. It does. - fun fact: retested with more reserved memory and with UEFI FW, host kernel crashes in init but directly starts the crash kernel, so it works (somehow) \o/
- hacking
TODOs
- fix elfcorehdr so that we actually can make use of all this...
- test where in the boot
__init()
chain we can/should callkexec_early_dump()
FizzBuzz OS by mssola
Project Description
FizzBuzz OS (or just fbos
) is an idea I've had in order to better grasp the fundamentals of the low level of a RISC-V machine. In practice, I'd like to build a small Operating System kernel that is able to launch three processes: one that simply prints "Fizz", another that prints "Buzz", and the third which prints "FizzBuzz". These processes are unaware of each other and it's up to the kernel to schedule them by using the timer interrupts as given on openSBI (fizz on % 3 seconds, buzz on % 5 seconds, and fizzbuzz on % 15 seconds).
This kernel provides just one system call, write
, which allows any program to pass the string to be written into stdout.
This project is free software and you can find it here.
Goal for this Hackweek
- Better understand the RISC-V SBI interface.
- Better understand RISC-V in privileged mode.
- Have fun.
Resources
Results
The project was a resounding success Lots of learning, and the initial target was met.
Create a DRM driver for VGA video cards by tdz
Yes, those VGA video cards. The goal of this project is to implement a DRM graphics driver for such devices. While actual hardware is hard to obtain or even run today, qemu emulates VGA output.
VGA has a number of limitations, which make this project interesting.
- There are only 640x480 pixels (or less) on the screen. That resolution is also a soft lower limit imposed by DRM. It's mostly a problem for desktop environments though.
- Desktop environments assume 16 million colors, but there are only 16 colors with VGA. VGA's 256 color palette is not available at 640x480. We can choose those 16 colors freely. The interesting part is how to choose them. We have to build a palette for the displayed frame and map each color to one of the palette's 16 entries. This is called dithering, and VGA's limitations are a good opportunity to learn about dithering algorithms.
- VGA has an interesting memory layout. Most graphics devices use linear framebuffers, which store the pixels byte by byte. VGA uses 4 bitplanes instead. Plane 0 holds all bits 0 of all pixels. Plane 1 holds all bits 1 of all pixels, and so on.
The driver will probably not be useful to many people. But, if finished, it can serve as test environment for low-level hardware. There's some interest in supporting old Amiga and Atari framebuffers in DRM. Those systems have similar limitations as VGA, but are harder to obtain and test with. With qemu, the VGA driver could fill this gap.
Apart from the Wikipedia entry, good resources on VGA are at osdev.net and FreeVGA
Modularization and Modernization of cifs.ko for Enhanced SMB Protocol Support by hcarvalho
Creator:
Enzo Matsumiya ematsumiya@suse.de @ SUSE Samba team
Members:
Henrique Carvalho henrique.carvalho@suse.com @ SUSE Samba team
Description
Split cifs.ko in 2 separate modules; one for SMB 1.0 and 2.0.x, and another for SMB 2.1, 3.0, and 3.1.1.
Goals
Primary
Start phasing out/deprecation of older SMB versions
Secondary
- Clean up of the code (with focus on the newer versions)
- Update cifs-utils
- Update documentation
- Improve backport workflow (see below)
Technical details
Ideas for the implementation.
- fs/smb/client/{old,new}.c to generate the respective modules
- Maybe don't create separate folders? (re-evaluate as things progresses!)
- Remove server->{ops,vals} if possible
- Clean up fs_context.* -- merge duplicate options into one, handle them in userspace utils
- Reduce code in smb2pdu.c -- tons of functions with very similar init/setup -> send/recv -> handle/free flow
- Restructure multichannel
- Treat initial connection as "channel 0" regardless of multichannel enabled/negotiated status, proceed with extra channels accordingly
- Extra channel just point to "channel 0" as the primary server, no need to allocate an extra TCPServerInfo for each one
- Authentication mechanisms
- Modernize algorithms (references: himmelblau, IAKERB/Local KDC, SCRAM, oauth2 (Azure), etc.
Contributing to Linux Kernel security by pperego
Description
A couple of weeks ago, I found this blog post by Gustavo Silva, a Linux Kernel contributor.
I always strived to start again into hacking the Linux Kernel, so I asked Coverity scan dashboard access and I want to contribute to Linux Kernel by fixing some minor issues.
I want also to create a Linux Kernel fuzzing lab using qemu and syzkaller
Goals
- Fix at least 2 security bugs
- Create the fuzzing lab and having it running
The story so far
- Day 1: setting up a virtual machine for kernel development using Tumbleweed. Reading a lot of documentation, taking confidence with Coverity dashboard and with procedures to submit a kernel patch
- Day 2: I read really a lot of documentation and I triaged some findings on Coverity SAST dashboard. I have to confirm that SAST tool are great false positives generator, even for low hanging fruits.
- Day 3: Working on trivial changes after I read this blog post:
https://www.toblux.com/posts/2024/02/linux-kernel-patches.html. I have to take confidence
with the patch preparation and submit process yet.
- First trivial patch sent: using strtruefalse() macro instead of hard-coded strings in a staging driver for a lcd display
- Fix for a dereference before null check issue discovered by Coverity (CID 1601566) https://scan7.scan.coverity.com/#/project-view/52110/11354?selectedIssue=1601566
- Day 4: Triaging more issues found by Coverity.
- The patch for CID 1601566 was refused. The check against the NULL pointer was pointless so I prepared a version 2 of the patch removing the check.
- Fixed another dereference before NULL check in iwlmvmparsewowlaninfo_notif() routine (CID 1601547). This one was already submitted by another kernel hacker :(
- Day 5: Wrapping up. I had to do some minor rework on patch for CID 1601566. I found a stalker bothering me in private emails and people I interacted with me, advised he is a well known bothering person. Markus Elfring for the record.
Wrapping up: being back doing kernel hacking is amazing and I don't want to stop it. My battery pack is completely drained but changing the scope gave me a great twist and I really want to feel this energy not doing a single task for months.
I failed in setting up a fuzzing lab but I was too optimistic for the patch submission process.
The patches