Description

The VulnHeap project is dedicated to the in-depth analysis and exploitation of vulnerabilities within heap memory management. It focuses on understanding the intricate workflow of heap allocation, chunk structures, and bin management, which are essential to identifying and mitigating security risks.

Goals

  • Familiarize with heap
    • Heap workflow
    • Chunk and bin structure
    • Vulnerabilities
  • Vulnerability
    • Use after free (UAF)
    • Heap overflow
    • Double free
  • Use Docker to create a vulnerable environment and apply techniques to exploit it

Resources

  • https://heap-exploitation.dhavalkapil.com/divingintoglibc_heap
  • https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cloudburst/libheap/master/heap.png
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap?tab=readme-ov-file

Looking for hackers with the skills:

linux security

This project is part of:

Hack Week 24

Activity

  • about 1 month ago: shunghsiyu liked this project.
  • about 1 month ago: r1chard-lyu liked this project.
  • about 2 months ago: r1chard-lyu added keyword "linux" to this project.
  • about 2 months ago: r1chard-lyu added keyword "security" to this project.
  • about 2 months ago: r1chard-lyu started this project.
  • about 2 months ago: r1chard-lyu originated this project.

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