During the last CSM workshop I started to refactor zypper-docker in a way that:

  • The CLI code and the "library" part got split.
  • I started to abstract zypper-specific commands.
  • I started a PoC "serve" command which allows zypper-docker to run as a server.

My main goal is to continue on this effort by following these steps (in no specific order):

  • Add another distro into the mix (Debian and Fedora come to my mind).
  • Implement the "serve" command (I'll probably write a spec before starting the hackweek).
  • Test: some existing tests have to be re-adapted or moved. I'll also add more tests.

I don't honestly expect to have everything implemented without any rough edges, it will probably be incomplete or lacking in some regard, but this can be polished over time. The main goal of this hackweek is to at least have the previous three points in a "good-enough" shape.

Looking for hackers with the skills:

docker zypper security

This project is part of:

Hack Week 14

Activity

  • over 8 years ago: tdig liked this project.
  • over 8 years ago: evshmarnev liked this project.
  • over 8 years ago: mssola liked this project.
  • over 8 years ago: mssola started this project.
  • over 8 years ago: mssola added keyword "docker" to this project.
  • over 8 years ago: mssola added keyword "zypper" to this project.
  • over 8 years ago: mssola added keyword "security" to this project.
  • over 8 years ago: mssola originated this project.

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