Project Description
The libkdumpfile library includes Python bindings. They are implemented as manually created C code for CPython. This is hard to maintain and/or port to alternative Python implementations.
Additionally, the whole project uses GNU autotools, which do not integrate well with Python packaging. There is currently a hack for distutils, but since distutils is going to be deprecated, a different solution is needed.
Goal for this Hackweek
The plan for this Hackweek is to rewrite them from scratch using the Python cffi package and distribute as a separate package (pykdumpfile ?).
Resources
This project is part of:
Hack Week 21
Activity
Comments
Similar Projects
Improve chore and screen time doc generator script `wochenplaner` by gniebler
Description
I wrote a little Python script to generate PDF docs, which can be used to track daily chore completion and screen time usage for several people, with one page per person/week.
I named this script wochenplaner and have been using it for a few months now.
It needs some improvements and adjustments in how the screen time should be tracked and how chores are displayed.
Goals
- Fix chore field separation lines
- Change screen time tracking logic from "global" (week-long) to daily subtraction and weekly addition of remainders (more intuitive than current "weekly time budget method)
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Resources
tbd (Gitlab repo)
Help Create A Chat Control Resistant Turnkey Chatmail/Deltachat Relay Stack - Rootless Podman Compose, OpenSUSE BCI, Hardened, & SELinux by 3nd5h1771fy
Description
The Mission: Decentralized & Sovereign Messaging
FYI: If you have never heard of "Chatmail", you can visit their site here, but simply put it can be thought of as the underlying protocol/platform decentralized messengers like DeltaChat use for their communications. Do not confuse it with the honeypot looking non-opensource paid for prodect with better seo that directs you to chatmailsecure(dot)com
In an era of increasing centralized surveillance by unaccountable bad actors (aka BigTech), "Chat Control," and the erosion of digital privacy, the need for sovereign communication infrastructure is critical. Chatmail is a pioneering initiative that bridges the gap between classic email and modern instant messaging, offering metadata-minimized, end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) communication that is interoperable and open.
However, unless you are a seasoned sysadmin, the current recommended deployment method of a Chatmail relay is rigid, fragile, difficult to properly secure, and effectively takes over the entire host the "relay" is deployed on.
Why This Matters
A simple, host agnostic, reproducible deployment lowers the entry cost for anyone wanting to run a privacy‑preserving, decentralized messaging relay. In an era of perpetually resurrected chat‑control legislation threats, EU digital‑sovereignty drives, and many dangers of using big‑tech messaging platforms (Apple iMessage, WhatsApp, FB Messenger, Instagram, SMS, Google Messages, etc...) for any type of communication, providing an easy‑to‑use alternative empowers:
- Censorship resistance - No single entity controls the relay; operators can spin up new nodes quickly.
- Surveillance mitigation - End‑to‑end OpenPGP encryption ensures relay operators never see plaintext.
- Digital sovereignty - Communities can host their own infrastructure under local jurisdiction, aligning with national data‑policy goals.
By turning the Chatmail relay into a plug‑and‑play container stack, we enable broader adoption, foster a resilient messaging fabric, and give developers, activists, and hobbyists a concrete tool to defend privacy online.
Goals
As I indicated earlier, this project aims to drastically simplify the deployment of Chatmail relay. By converting this architecture into a portable, containerized stack using Podman and OpenSUSE base container images, we can allow anyone to deploy their own censorship-resistant, privacy-preserving communications node in minutes.
Our goal for Hack Week: package every component into containers built on openSUSE/MicroOS base images, initially orchestrated with a single container-compose.yml (podman-compose compatible). The stack will:
- Run on any host that supports Podman (including optimizations and enhancements for SELinux‑enabled systems).
- Allow network decoupling by refactoring configurations to move from file-system constrained Unix sockets to internal TCP networking, allowing containers achieve stricter isolation.
- Utilize Enhanced Security with SELinux by using purpose built utilities such as udica we can quickly generate custom SELinux policies for the container stack, ensuring strict confinement superior to standard/typical Docker deployments.
- Allow the use of bind or remote mounted volumes for shared data (
/var/vmail, DKIM keys, TLS certs, etc.). - Replace the local DNS server requirement with a remote DNS‑provider API for DKIM/TXT record publishing.
By delivering a turnkey, host agnostic, reproducible deployment, we lower the barrier for individuals and small communities to launch their own chatmail relays, fostering a decentralized, censorship‑resistant messaging ecosystem that can serve DeltaChat users and/or future services adopting this protocol
Resources
- The links included above
- https://chatmail.at/doc/relay/
- https://delta.chat/en/help
- Project repo -> https://codeberg.org/EndShittification/containerized-chatmail-relay
Enhance git-sha-verify: A tool to checkout validated git hashes by gpathak
Description
git-sha-verify is a simple shell utility to verify and checkout trusted git commits signed using GPG key. This tool helps ensure that only authorized or validated commit hashes are checked out from a git repository, supporting better code integrity and security within the workflow.
Supports:
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Ideal for teams and projects where the integrity of git history is crucial.
Goals
A minimal python code of the shell script exists as a pull request.
The goal of this hackweek is to:
- Add more unit tests
- Make the python code modular
- DONE: Add code coverage if possible
Resources
- Link to GitHub Repository: https://github.com/openSUSE/git-sha-verify
Liz - Prompt autocomplete by ftorchia
Description
Liz is the Rancher AI assistant for cluster operations.
Goals
We want to help users when sending new messages to Liz, by adding an autocomplete feature to complete their requests based on the context.
Example:
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Example:
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Technical Overview
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Resources
Testing and adding GNU/Linux distributions on Uyuni by juliogonzalezgil
Join the Gitter channel! https://gitter.im/uyuni-project/hackweek
Uyuni is a configuration and infrastructure management tool that saves you time and headaches when you have to manage and update tens, hundreds or even thousands of machines. It also manages configuration, can run audits, build image containers, monitor and much more!
Currently there are a few distributions that are completely untested on Uyuni or SUSE Manager (AFAIK) or just not tested since a long time, and could be interesting knowing how hard would be working with them and, if possible, fix whatever is broken.
For newcomers, the easiest distributions are those based on DEB or RPM packages. Distributions with other package formats are doable, but will require adapting the Python and Java code to be able to sync and analyze such packages (and if salt does not support those packages, it will need changes as well). So if you want a distribution with other packages, make sure you are comfortable handling such changes.
No developer experience? No worries! We had non-developers contributors in the past, and we are ready to help as long as you are willing to learn. If you don't want to code at all, you can also help us preparing the documentation after someone else has the initial code ready, or you could also help with testing :-)
The idea is testing Salt and Salt-ssh clients, but NOT traditional clients, which are deprecated.
To consider that a distribution has basic support, we should cover at least (points 3-6 are to be tested for both salt minions and salt ssh minions):
- Reposync (this will require using spacewalk-common-channels and adding channels to the .ini file)
- Onboarding (salt minion from UI, salt minion from bootstrap scritp, and salt-ssh minion) (this will probably require adding OS to the bootstrap repository creator)
- Package management (install, remove, update...)
- Patching
- Applying any basic salt state (including a formula)
- Salt remote commands
- Bonus point: Java part for product identification, and monitoring enablement
- Bonus point: sumaform enablement (https://github.com/uyuni-project/sumaform)
- Bonus point: Documentation (https://github.com/uyuni-project/uyuni-docs)
- Bonus point: testsuite enablement (https://github.com/uyuni-project/uyuni/tree/master/testsuite)
If something is breaking: we can try to fix it, but the main idea is research how supported it is right now. Beyond that it's up to each project member how much to hack :-)
- If you don't have knowledge about some of the steps: ask the team
- If you still don't know what to do: switch to another distribution and keep testing.
This card is for EVERYONE, not just developers. Seriously! We had people from other teams helping that were not developers, and added support for Debian and new SUSE Linux Enterprise and openSUSE Leap versions :-)
Pending
Debian 13
The new version of the beloved Debian GNU/Linux OS
[W]Reposync (this will require using spacewalk-common-channels and adding channels to the .ini file)[ ]Onboarding (salt minion from UI, salt minion from bootstrap script, and salt-ssh minion) (this will probably require adding OS to the bootstrap repository creator)[ ]Package management (install, remove, update...)[ ]Patching (if patch information is available, could require writing some code to parse it, but IIRC we have support for Ubuntu already). Probably not for Debian as IIRC we don't support patches yet.[ ]Applying any basic salt state (including a formula)[ ]Salt remote commands[ ]Bonus point: Java part for product identification, and monitoring enablement[ ]Bonus point: sumaform enablement (https://github.com/uyuni-project/sumaform)[ ]Bonus point: Documentation (https://github.com/uyuni-project/uyuni-docs)[ ]Bonus point: testsuite enablement (https://github.com/uyuni-project/uyuni/tree/master/testsuite)
early stage kdump support by mbrugger
Project Description
When we experience a early boot crash, we are not able to analyze the kernel dump, as user-space wasn't able to load the crash system. The idea is to make the crash system compiled into the host kernel (think of initramfs) so that we can create a kernel dump really early in the boot process.
Goal for the Hackweeks
- Investigate if this is possible and the implications it would have (done in HW21)
- Hack up a PoC (done in HW22 and HW23)
- Prepare RFC series (giving it's only one week, we are entering wishful thinking territory here).
update HW23
- I was able to include the crash kernel into the kernel Image.
- I'll need to find a way to load that from
init/main.c:start_kernel()probably afterkcsan_init() - I workaround for a smoke test was to hack
kexec_file_load()systemcall which has two problems:- My initramfs in the porduction kernel does not have a new enough kexec version, that's not a blocker but where the week ended
- As the crash kernel is part of init.data it will be already stale once I can call
kexec_file_load()from user-space.
The solution is probably to rewrite the POC so that the invocation can be done from init.text (that's my theory) but I'm not sure if I can reuse the kexec infrastructure in the kernel from there, which I rely on heavily.
update HW24
- Day1
- rebased on v6.12 with no problems others then me breaking the config
- setting up a new compilation and qemu/virtme env
- getting desperate as nothing works that used to work
- Day 2
- getting to call the invocation of loading the early kernel from
__initafterkcsan_init()
- getting to call the invocation of loading the early kernel from
Day 3
- fix problem of memdup not being able to alloc so much memory... use 64K page sizes for now
- code refactoring
- I'm now able to load the crash kernel
- When using virtme I can boot into the crash kernel, also it doesn't boot completely (major milestone!), crash in
elfcorehdr_read_notes()
Day 4
- crash systems crashes (no pun intended) in
copy_old_mempage()link; will need to understand elfcorehdr... - call path
vmcore_init() -> parse_crash_elf_headers() -> elfcorehdr_read() -> read_from_oldmem() -> copy_oldmem_page() -> copy_to_iter()
- crash systems crashes (no pun intended) in
Day 5
- hacking
arch/arm64/kernel/crash_dump.c:copy_old_mempage()to see if crash system really starts. It does. - fun fact: retested with more reserved memory and with UEFI FW, host kernel crashes in init but directly starts the crash kernel, so it works (somehow) \o/
- hacking
update HW25
- Day 1
- rebased crash-kernel on v6.12.59 (for now), still crashing