Model checking the BPF verifier
a project by shunghsiyu
Updated about 1 year ago. 9 hacker ♥️. 3 followers.

Project Description

BPF verifier plays a crucial role in securing the system (though less so now that unprivileged BPF is disabled by default in both upstream and SLES), and bugs in the verifier has lead to privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the past (e.g. CVE-2021-3490).

One way to check whether the verifer has bugs to use model checking (a formal verification technique), in other words, build a abstract model of how the verifier operates, and then see if certain condition can occur (e.g. incorrect calculation during value tracking of registers) by giving both the model and condition to a solver.

For the solver I will be using the Z3 SMT solver to do the checking since it provide a Python binding that's relatively easy to use.

Goal for this Hackweek

Learn how to use the Z3 Python binding (i.e. Z3Py) to build a model of (part of) the BPF verifier, probably the part that's related to value tracking using tristate numbers (aka tnum), and then check that the algorithm work as intended.

Resources

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Looking for hackers with the skills:

bpf ebpf formalverification modelchecking kernel security

This project is part of:

Hack Week 21 Hack Week 23 Hack Week 24

Activity

  • 2 months ago: janvhs liked this project.
  • 2 months ago: flonnegren liked this project.
  • 2 months ago: vliaskovitis liked this project.
  • 3 months ago: r1chard-lyu liked this project.
  • about 1 year ago: moio liked this project.
  • over 2 years ago: dsterba liked this project.
  • over 2 years ago: mbrugger liked this project.
  • over 2 years ago: jzerebecki left this project.
  • over 2 years ago: jzerebecki added keyword "security" to this project.
  • over 2 years ago: jzerebecki joined this project.
  • over 2 years ago: jzerebecki liked this project.
  • over 2 years ago: ailiopoulos liked this project.
  • over 2 years ago: shunghsiyu started this project.
  • over 2 years ago: shunghsiyu added keyword "kernel" to this project.
  • over 2 years ago: shunghsiyu added keyword "bpf" to this project.
  • over 2 years ago: shunghsiyu added keyword "ebpf" to this project.
  • over 2 years ago: shunghsiyu added keyword "formalverification" to this project.
  • over 2 years ago: shunghsiyu added keyword "modelchecking" to this project.
  • over 2 years ago: shunghsiyu originated this project.


    • Comments

    • shunghsiyu
      over 2 years ago by shunghsiyu | Reply

      I've uploaded the jupyter notebook on GitHub that contains a minimal model of tnum along with tnum_add(), as well as the prove that it works.

    • shunghsiyu
      over 2 years ago by shunghsiyu | Reply

      The slides used for lightning talk can be found here

      While I'd like to achieve much more, I think what I've done during hack week is suffice to be called a complete project, so I'm marking this as complete

    • shunghsiyu
      about 1 year ago by shunghsiyu | Reply

      I'm restarting this project to model check the range tracking (minimal and maximal value possible in s32/u32/u64/s64 range) done in BPF verifier.

      In addition to that I hope to unify signed and unsigned range tracking based on previously posted idea and the "Interval Analysis and Machine Arithmetic: Why Signedness Ignorance Is Bliss" paper for simpler range tracking code.

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