Migrate from Docker to Podman by tjyrinki_suse

Description

I'd like to continue my former work on containerization of several domains on a single server by changing from Docker containers to Podman containers. That will need an OS upgrade as well as Podman is not available in that old server version.

Goals

• Update OS.
• Migrate from Docker to Podman.
• Keep everything functional, including the existing "meanwhile done" additional Docker container that is actually being used already.
• Keep everything at least as secure as currently. One of the reasons of having the containers is to isolate risks related to services open to public Internet.
• Try to enable the Podman use in production.
• At minimum, learn about all of these topics.
• Optionally, improve Ansible side of things as well...

Resources

A search engine is one's friend. Migrating from Docker to Podman, and from docker-compose to podman-compose.

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Ansible for add-on management by lmanfredi

Description

Machines can contains various combinations of add-ons and are often modified during the time.

The list of repos can change so I would like to create an automation able to reset the status to a given state, based on metadata available for these machines

Goals

Create an Ansible automation able to take care of add-on (repo list) configuration using metadata as reference

Resources

• Machines
• Repositories
• Developing modules
• Basic VM Guest management
• Module zypper_repository_list
• ansible-collections community.general
  • plugins/modules/zypper.py
  • plugins/modules/zypper_repository.py
  • plugins/modules/zypperrepositoryinfo.py

Results

Created WIP project Ansible-add-on-openSUSE

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"autoremove" functionality for zypper by e_bischoff

The purpose would be to have the equivalent of Ubuntu's "apt-get autoremove" functionality.

When you install package P, it might draw in dependancies D1, D2, ... Dn automatically.

When you later uninstall P, the dependancies D1, D2, ..., Dn might remain on your system.

If you keep installing and uninstalling packages, after a while your system remains cluttered with things you don't need.

The idea would be to mark all dependancies that were installed but not explicitely requested as "installed automatically". Then a command like "zypper autoremove" could remove them at once if they are not needed anymore.

Approaches seen online

After scouring forms for solutions these are some alias's used to replicate the functionality

1. zypper packages --unneeded | awk -F'|' 'NR==0 || NR==1 || NR==2 || NR==3 || NR==4 {next} {print $3}' | grep -v Name | sudo xargs zypper remove --clean-deps

2. This one is a script and has bashisms bash mapfile -t unneeded < <(zypper --quiet pa --unneeded | awk '$1 == "i" { print $5, "-", $7 }') (( ${#unneeded@]} )) && sudo zypper --quiet rm --clean-deps --details "${unneeded@]}"

3. sudo zypper rm $(zypper pa --unneeded | awk '/i / {print $3}' FS='|' | uniq | tr -d ' ')

Based on testing zypper packages --orphaned provides packages that are not in any repo, even if a user has explicitly installed them, so --orphaned may not be the way to go, instead focusing on --unneeded

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CVE portal for SUSE Rancher products by gmacedo

Description

Currently it's a bit difficult for users to quickly see the list of CVEs affecting images in Rancher, RKE2, Harvester and Longhorn releases. Users need to individually look for each CVE in the SUSE CVE database page - https://www.suse.com/security/cve/ . This is not optimal, because those CVE pages are a bit hard to read and contain data for all SLE and BCI products too, making it difficult to easily see only the CVEs affecting the latest release of Rancher, for example. We understand that certain costumers are only looking for CVE data for Rancher and not SLE or BCI.

Goals

The objective is to create a simple to read and navigate page that contains only CVE data related to Rancher, RKE2, Harvester and Longhorn, where it's easy to search by a CVE ID, an image name or a release version. The page should also provide the raw data as an exportable CSV file.

It must be an MVP with the minimal amount of effort/time invested, but still providing great value to our users and saving the wasted time that the Rancher Security team needs to spend by manually sharing such data. It might not be long lived, as it can be replaced in 2-3 years with a better SUSE wide solution.

Resources

• The page must be simple and easy to read.
• The UI/UX must be as straightforward as possible with minimal visual noise.
• The content must be created automatically from the raw data that we already have internally.
• It must be updated automatically on a daily basis and on ad-hoc runs (when needed).
• The CVE status must be aligned with VEX.
• The raw data must be exportable as CSV file.
• Ideally it will be written in Go or pure Shell script with basic HTML and no external dependencies in CSS or JS.

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Bot to identify reserved data leak in local files or when publishing on remote repository by mdati

Description

Scope here is to prevent reserved data or generally "unwanted", to be pushed and saved on a public repository, i.e. on Github, causing disclosure or leaking of reserved informations.

The above definition of reserved or "unwanted" may vary, depending on the context: sometime secret keys or password are stored in data or configuration files or hardcoded in source code and depending on the scope of the archive or the level of security, it can be either wanted, permitted or not at all.

As main target here, secrets will be registration keys or passwords, to be detected and managed locally or in a C.I. pipeline.

Goals

• Detection:

  • Local detection: detect secret words present in local files;
  • Remote detection: detect secrets in files, in pipelines, going to be transferred on a remote repository, i.e. via git push;

• Reporting:

  • report the result of detection on stderr and/or log files, noticed excluding the secret values.

• Acton:

  • Manage the detection, by either deleting or masking the impacted code or deleting/moving the file itself or simply notify it.

Resources

• Project repository, published on Github (link): m-dati/hkwk24;
• Reference folder: hkwk24/chksecret;
• First pull request (link): PR#1;
• Second PR, for improvements: PR#2;
• README.md and TESTS.md documentation files available in the repo root;
• Test subproject repository, for testing CI on push [TBD].

Notes

We use here some examples of secret words, that still can be improved.
The various patterns to match desired reserved words are written in a separated module, to be on demand updated or customized.

[Legend: TBD = to be done]

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VulnHeap by r1chard-lyu

Description

The VulnHeap project is dedicated to the in-depth analysis and exploitation of vulnerabilities within heap memory management. It focuses on understanding the intricate workflow of heap allocation, chunk structures, and bin management, which are essential to identifying and mitigating security risks.

Goals

• Familiarize with heap
  • Heap workflow
  • Chunk and bin structure
  • Vulnerabilities
• Vulnerability
  • Use after free (UAF)
  • Heap overflow
  • Double free
• Use Docker to create a vulnerable environment and apply techniques to exploit it

Resources

• https://heap-exploitation.dhavalkapil.com/divingintoglibc_heap
• https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cloudburst/libheap/master/heap.png
• https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap?tab=readme-ov-file

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Model checking the BPF verifier by shunghsiyu

Project Description

BPF verifier plays a crucial role in securing the system (though less so now that unprivileged BPF is disabled by default in both upstream and SLES), and bugs in the verifier has lead to privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the past (e.g. CVE-2021-3490).

One way to check whether the verifer has bugs to use model checking (a formal verification technique), in other words, build a abstract model of how the verifier operates, and then see if certain condition can occur (e.g. incorrect calculation during value tracking of registers) by giving both the model and condition to a solver.

For the solver I will be using the Z3 SMT solver to do the checking since it provide a Python binding that's relatively easy to use.

Goal for this Hackweek

Learn how to use the Z3 Python binding (i.e. Z3Py) to build a model of (part of) the BPF verifier, probably the part that's related to value tracking using tristate numbers (aka tnum), and then check that the algorithm work as intended.

Resources

• Formal Methods for the Informal Engineer: Tutorial #1 - The Z3 Theorem Prover and its accompanying notebook is a great introduction into Z3
  • Has a section specifically on model checking
• Software Verification and Analysis Using Z3 a great example of using Z3 for model checking
• Sound, Precise, and Fast Abstract Interpretation with Tristate Numbers - existing work that use formal verification to prove that the multiplication helper used for value tracking work as intended
• [PATCH v5 net-next 00/12] bpf: rewrite value tracking in verifier - initial patch set that adds tristate number to the verifier

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Migrate from Docker to Podman by tjyrinki_suse

Description

I'd like to continue my former work on containerization of several domains on a single server by changing from Docker containers to Podman containers. That will need an OS upgrade as well as Podman is not available in that old server version.

Goals

• Update OS.
• Migrate from Docker to Podman.
• Keep everything functional, including the existing "meanwhile done" additional Docker container that is actually being used already.
• Keep everything at least as secure as currently. One of the reasons of having the containers is to isolate risks related to services open to public Internet.
• Try to enable the Podman use in production.
• At minimum, learn about all of these topics.
• Optionally, improve Ansible side of things as well...

Resources

A search engine is one's friend. Migrating from Docker to Podman, and from docker-compose to podman-compose.

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